HIM FPX 2660 Assessment 2 privacy incident analysis example

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This HIM FPX 2660 Assessment 2 sample paper is a privacy incident analysis investigating an employee snooping incident, with a timeline from the audit log, the limits of the log and the notification decision. It belongs to Capella HIM FPX 2660, Ethics and Compliance in Healthcare Data Management, which health information management students take as HIM-FPX2660. The paper states the incident, builds the timeline only from what the audit trail records, and explains what the log cannot prove. It names control failures as system problems, assesses risk against the information actually reached, works out notification duties under the Breach Notification Rule and sets corrective actions.

CourseHIM FPX 2660 Ethics and Compliance in Healthcare Data Management
AssessmentAssessment 2
Paper typePrivacy incident investigation
LengthAbout 1,100 words, 5 pages
FormatAPA 7 student paper
SchoolCapella University
ProgramBS in Health Information Management
UpdatedSeptember 2026

Free sample paper for HIM FPX 2660 Assessment 2

1

Investigating an Employee Snooping Incident: A Timeline From the Audit Log, the Limits of the Log, and the Notification Decision

Student Name

Capella University

HIM FPX 2660: Ethics and Compliance in Healthcare Data Management

Instructor Name

Month Day, Year

What this part is doingThe title names the incident, the evidence source, and the decision. Privacy investigations are judged on whether conclusions stay within the evidence, so the log's limits are named.
2

The Incident

A nurse at a composite hospital, here called Riverside General, complained that a coworker, a unit clerk, knew details of the nurse's recent emergency department visit. The privacy officer opened an investigation and ran an audit of all access to the nurse's record.

Timeline Built Only From the Log

The timeline was built only from the electronic health record's audit log, which records the user, date, time, workstation, patient, and screens opened. Statements from staff were collected separately and are not used to fill gaps in the timeline.

Date and timeUserAction recorded
Day 1, 22:14Unit clerkOpened complainant's record; viewed emergency department note (4 min)
Day 1, 22:19Unit clerkViewed laboratory results (2 min)
Day 3, 07:02Unit clerkOpened complainant's record; viewed discharge instructions (1 min)
Day 3, 07:05Unit clerkPrinted discharge instructions

The clerk had no role in the nurse's care. The emergency department is on a different floor from the clerk's unit, and the clerk's job does not require access to emergency records. Because one inappropriate access is often part of a pattern, the privacy officer then audited all of the clerk's access for the past 12 months against the clerk's assigned unit and patients. This found access to 37 other patients' records with no apparent work reason, including 11 coworkers, 9 people with the same surname as the clerk, and 17 patients who had been in the local news. Building the timeline only from the log keeps the investigation's findings separate from what people say happened, which may differ.

What this part is doingThe timeline uses only audit data, and the audit is extended beyond the first complaint. Scorers reward investigations that establish facts from records before drawing conclusions.
3

What the Audit Trail Cannot Prove

The log shows that screens were opened and a document was printed. It cannot prove what the clerk read, whether the clerk photographed the screen with a phone, what happened to the printed copy, or whether the clerk told anyone else. It cannot prove intent: some accesses may have been mistakes, such as opening the wrong patient with a similar name. The log also cannot show that the clerk was the person at the keyboard; another person could have used the clerk's session if the clerk left the workstation unlocked. These limits must be stated in the findings so that conclusions do not go beyond the evidence.

Control Failures Named as Systems

The investigation looked beyond the individual to the controls that allowed the access. Access controls: the clerk's role had access to all patient records in the hospital, not just the assigned unit, because the role had been set up years ago for convenience. Monitoring: the hospital's audit tool generated alerts only for access to records of patients flagged as VIPs, not for access to coworkers' or same-surname records, which are the most common patterns in snooping. Workstation controls: the printer on the clerk's unit did not require a badge to release print jobs. Training: the clerk's annual privacy training was current, which suggests that training alone did not prevent the behavior. Naming control failures as system failures does not excuse the individual, but it shows what the organization must fix to prevent the next case.

What this part is doingEach control failure is identified and described as a system problem. Scorers reward investigations that address both individual and organizational causes.
4

Risk Assessed Against What Was Reached

Under the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, any use or disclosure the Privacy Rule does not permit counts as a breach unless the covered entity demonstrates a low probability that the information has been compromised, based on a risk assessment of at least four factors: what kind of information was involved and how much of it, the unauthorized person who used it or to whom it was disclosed, whether the information was actually acquired or viewed, and the extent to which the risk has been mitigated (45 C.F.R. ยง 164.402; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2025). Applied to the complainant: the information included emergency visit details, laboratory results, and discharge instructions; the clerk viewed and printed it; the clerk then apparently shared details, based on the complaint; and the printed copy has not been recovered. The probability of compromise is not low. This is a breach. Applied to the other 37 patients: all records were viewed, not merely opened by mistake, based on time spent on clinical screens of several minutes each. The information varied from demographics to full clinical notes. The clerk is a workforce member bound by confidentiality, which lowers risk somewhat, but the pattern of access suggests personal interest rather than error, and the hospital cannot show that information was not further used. The privacy officer concluded that a low probability of compromise could not be demonstrated for 34 of the 37; for 3, the log shows the record was closed within seconds from a patient list screen, consistent with a mistaken selection, and those were assessed as low probability.

Notification Duties Worked Out

For the 35 breaches (the complainant and 34 others), the hospital must send each affected individual a notice promptly, and in any case within 60 calendar days of discovering the breach. Because fewer than 500 individuals are affected, the hospital must log the breach and report it to the Secretary of Health and Human Services within 60 days after the end of the calendar year in which it was discovered; media notice is not required, since that applies to breaches affecting more than 500 residents of a state or jurisdiction. The notification letters must describe what happened, the types of information involved, steps individuals should take, what the hospital is doing, and contact information. The date of discovery is the date the complaint was received, since that is when the breach was known or reasonably should have been known.

Corrective Actions

The clerk's access was suspended on the day of discovery and the matter referred to human resources under the sanctions policy. The clerk's role will be restricted to the assigned unit. The audit tool will be configured to alert on access to coworker records and same-surname records. Badge release will be installed on unit printers. The privacy officer will repeat the coworker and same-surname audit across all users each quarter for a year, to learn whether this case was isolated.

Conclusion

The investigation built its timeline only from the audit log, stated what the log cannot prove, identified system control failures, assessed risk for each affected person, and worked out notification duties under federal rules. Thirty-five breaches require individual notification and inclusion in the annual report to federal regulators.

5

References

U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. (2025). Security and privacy (45 C.F.R. pt. 164). U.S. Government Publishing Office.

Reading the HIM-FPX2660 Assessment 2 instructions

The instructions ask you to investigate a privacy incident and determine the organization's obligations. You describe the incident, build a timeline from evidence such as audit logs, separate evidence from inference, identify the control failures that allowed it, assess the risk using the HIPAA four-factor risk assessment, decide whether notification is required and to whom, and recommend corrective actions. Employee snooping, misdirected faxes and lost devices are common scenarios. HHS breach guidance and the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule are the core sources. The investigation should be fair to the employee as well as the patient, and it should reach a conclusion the privacy officer could sign.

How the HIM-FPX2660 Assessment 2 example is put together

The example moves from evidence to cause to obligation. It opens with the incident stated in two sentences and the question the investigation has to settle. The timeline follows, built only from what the audit trail records, with inference clearly separated from evidence. The third section works backwards from the access to the controls that should have stopped it, and treats each failure as a system property rather than as a personal defect, because a control that depends on everyone behaving is not a control. The fourth section assesses risk to the individuals whose information was reached, using the factors a breach determination expects. The fifth section sets out containment, sanction and notification with the timing each carries. The example closes on the control change that would prevent a repetition.

Reading the HIM FPX 2660 Assessment 2 scoring guide

The scoring guide rates the incident description, the timeline, the evidence analysis, the control failures, the risk assessment, the notification decision and the corrective actions. The timeline reaches Distinguished when built only from logged evidence. Evidence analysis scores higher when the limits of the log are stated, such as views recorded but not what the employee did with the information. Control failures earn credit when described as system problems. The risk assessment should apply the four factors. Notification should state who must be told and by when. Corrective actions should address causes, not only discipline, such as proactive audit reports that flag employees viewing records of coworkers.

HIM FPX 2660 Assessment 2 help from the desk

Students often write the timeline from assumptions rather than from log entries with dates and times. Another common mistake is treating the audit log as proof of everything, including intent. Control failures are blamed on the employee alone. The risk assessment skips the four factors. Notification deadlines are wrong. Corrective actions stop at firing the employee. Separating what the log shows from what is inferred makes the investigation defensible. Interviewing the employee, with human resources present, is part of a fair process. Patients whose records were viewed deserve a clear explanation, not only a form letter. Check whether state law adds notification duties beyond HIPAA, since several states do.

Get a HIM FPX 2660 Assessment 2 example written to your instructions

Send the Assessment 2 instructions and the scoring guide from your HIM FPX 2660 courseroom, along with the incident scenario and any log extract it supplies. We write a custom example against those criteria, with evidence and inference kept apart, and return it in 24 to 48 hours. The first custom sample is free. The paper above is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Capella University document.

More HIM FPX 2660 papers and BS in Health Information Management samples

HIM FPX 2660 Assessment 2 questions, answered

Is every inappropriate access a reportable breach?

Not automatically, and the analysis is what determines it. The rule expects an assessment of the information involved, who reached it, whether it was actually acquired or viewed, and how far the risk has been reduced. A paper that declares a breach without that assessment, or dismisses one without it, misses the criterion. Work the factors and state what each supports.

How much detail should the timeline include?

Enough that a reader could follow the access without you narrating it. Each entry needs a time, an account, a location or workstation, and what was reached. Leave out anything the log does not record, and mark inference as inference. In many sections the scenario supplies a partial log on purpose, and saying what is missing is part of the answer.

Should the analysis recommend discipline?

Sanction usually belongs in the response, since a compliance program that never applies one is not credible. Keep it proportionate, tie it to a written policy rather than to how visible the incident became, and give equal space to the control change. A paper that ends at punishment leaves the organization in the position it started from.

Where can I find a free HIM FPX 2660 Assessment 2 sample paper?

This page contains the full snooping investigation, with the audit log timeline, its limits, control failures, risk assessment, notification decision and corrective actions. A model investigation of another incident can be requested free.

When is breach notification required in HIM FPX 2660 Assessment 2?

When unsecured protected health information is accessed or disclosed improperly and the four-factor risk assessment does not show a low probability of compromise. Individuals must be notified without unreasonable delay and within 60 days of discovery.