| Course | BHA FPX 3112 Introduction to Healthcare Economics |
|---|---|
| Assessment | Assessment 1 |
| Paper type | Economic concept application |
| Length | About 1,080 words, 5 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Capella University |
| Program | BS in Health Care Administration |
| Updated | September 2026 |
Free sample paper for BHA FPX 3112 Assessment 1
One Market Behavior Explained: Why People Use More Care When Insurance Pays More, and Where the Concept Stops
Student Name
Capella University
BHA FPX 3112: Introduction to Healthcare Economics
Instructor Name
Month Day, Year
One Market Behavior, Described First
When patients pay less of the cost of care out of pocket, they use more care. When they pay more, they use less. This behavior can be seen in everyday health care: employees who move from a plan with low copayments to a high-deductible plan often reduce their visits to physicians, fill fewer prescriptions, and delay elective procedures, at least until they reach their deductible. Health care managers see the effect in their volumes when a large local employer changes plans. This paper explains the behavior using economic concepts.
Concepts Defined and Then Used
Price elasticity of demand measures how much the quantity demanded changes when price changes. If a 10% increase in price leads to a 2% decrease in quantity, demand is inelastic, with an elasticity of minus 0.2. Moral hazard, in insurance, refers to the change in behavior that occurs because a person is insured. In health care, it usually means that insured people use more care than they would if they paid the full price, because insurance lowers the price they face at the point of use. Cost-sharing refers to the portion of the cost patients pay, through deductibles, copayments, and coinsurance. These concepts can be used to explain the behavior. Insurance lowers the out-of-pocket price of care. Because demand for health care responds to price, even if modestly, lower prices lead to more use. The additional use caused by lower out-of-pocket prices is moral hazard. The strongest evidence comes from the RAND Health Insurance Experiment, conducted from the mid-1970s to the early 1980s, in which families were randomly assigned to insurance plans with different levels of cost-sharing, from free care to 95% coinsurance up to an annual limit. Manning et al. (1987) reported that families with free care used substantially more services than those with cost-sharing, with spending per person roughly 30% lower in the plan with the most cost-sharing than in the free care plan, and they estimated the price elasticity of demand for medical care at about minus 0.2. Demand responded to price, but not strongly. Defining each concept and then applying it to the behavior shows understanding rather than recall of definitions.
The Incentive Chain Spelled Out
The chain runs as follows. An employer chooses a health plan with low cost-sharing. The employee's out-of-pocket price for a physician visit falls from, say, 150 dollars to a 20 dollar copayment. Facing a lower price, the employee is more likely to visit for minor symptoms, such as a cold or a mild ache, that would otherwise be managed at home. The physician's practice sees more visits and bills the insurer. The insurer's costs rise, and it raises premiums the following year. The employer pays higher premiums, which may reduce wage increases for employees. The chain shows that the cost of additional use does not disappear; it returns through premiums and wages, though no individual patient sees the connection at the moment of choosing care.
Where Health Care Breaks the Assumption
Standard models of demand assume that consumers know what they are buying, can judge its value, and choose freely. Arrow (1963) argued that health care differs from ordinary markets in several ways: illness is unpredictable, patients lack the medical knowledge to judge what care they need, physicians act as agents who both advise on and supply care, and the quality of care is hard to judge even afterward. These features break the assumption that more use caused by lower prices is simply wasteful. The RAND experiment found that cost-sharing reduced both care that was likely effective and care that was less effective, because patients could not reliably tell the difference. For some low-income participants with high blood pressure, free care was associated with better blood pressure control. In ordinary markets, reduced demand at higher prices removes purchases of low value; in health care, it may also remove care of high value.
What the Concept Does Not Explain
Moral hazard explains why use rises when out-of-pocket prices fall, but it does not explain everything about health care use. It does not explain large differences in use across regions with similar insurance, which reflect physicians' practice patterns and the supply of hospitals and specialists. It does not explain use driven by physician recommendations, where the patient has little choice. It does not tell us whether additional use is valuable, which depends on the type of care. And it does not capture the effect of insurance in protecting people from financial ruin, which is the main purpose of insurance and has value even if it increases use. Stating what a concept does not explain prevents it from being used as a complete theory of health care spending.
An Example in a Local Market
A composite example shows the concept at work. A regional manufacturer with 4,000 employees switches from a plan with a 25 dollar copayment for specialist visits to a high-deductible plan in which employees pay the full negotiated price, about 180 dollars, until they meet a 3,000 dollar deductible. A local orthopedic practice that treats many of the manufacturer's employees sees new patient visits from those employees fall by about a fifth in the first half of the year, then recover partly in the autumn as some employees meet their deductibles. The pattern matches the concept: demand fell when the out-of-pocket price rose, and it rebounded when the price effectively fell to zero after the deductible was met.
Implications for Health Care Managers
For managers, the concept helps anticipate how changes in patients' insurance affect volumes, especially for elective and outpatient services. It also suggests that value-based insurance designs, which deliberately lower cost-sharing for high-value care such as diabetes medications while keeping it higher for low-value care, may preserve beneficial use while discouraging less valuable use.
Conclusion
People use more care when insurance lowers their out-of-pocket price, a behavior explained by price elasticity and moral hazard and documented in the RAND experiment. Health care departs from the standard model because patients cannot easily judge the value of care, so higher cost-sharing can reduce valuable care along with less valuable care. The concept explains the direction of the behavior but not regional variation, physician-driven use, or the protective value of insurance.
References
Arrow, K. J. (1963). Uncertainty and the welfare economics of medical care. The American Economic Review, 53(5), 941-973.
Manning, W. G., Newhouse, J. P., Duan, N., Keeler, E. B., Leibowitz, A., & Marquis, M. S. (1987). Health insurance and the demand for medical care: Evidence from a randomized experiment. The American Economic Review, 77(3), 251-277.
What the BHA FPX 3112 Assessment 1 instructions ask for
The first assessment in BHA FPX 3112 asks you to apply one or more economic concepts to a health care market behavior. You describe the behavior clearly, define the concepts, explain how they account for the behavior, identify where health care differs from standard markets and discuss implications for managers. Common concepts include supply and demand, elasticity, moral hazard, adverse selection and asymmetric information. The paper should use the concepts to explain, not just define them. Evidence such as the RAND Health Insurance Experiment or studies of deductibles supports the analysis. A concrete local example, such as emergency department use after a change in copays, makes the economics real.
How this BHA FPX 3112 Assessment 1 example is built
The example is short and built around one case. It opens by describing the market behavior in enough detail that a reader can picture it, including who the buyers are, who the sellers are and what is being exchanged. The concept section introduces two or three economic ideas, each defined briefly with a citation from a text or a peer reviewed source. Application is the center of the paper: each concept is turned on the case in its own passage, showing the incentive, the response and the result. A section on healthcare specific conditions explains why third party payment, licensure or information gaps change how the concept behaves here. The example ends with implications for a manager, stating what the analysis would change about a decision.
BHA FPX 3112 Assessment 1 scoring guide: what Distinguished looks like
Five parts are graded: the behavior described, the concepts defined, their application, how health care differs and what managers should take from it. The first reaches Distinguished when buyers, sellers and what is exchanged are clear. Definitions score higher when accurate and brief. Application earns credit when the incentive chain is spelled out step by step, from lower out-of-pocket cost to higher use. Health care differences, such as third-party payment and patients relying on physicians' advice, show depth. Naming what the concept does not explain shows critical thinking. Implications for managers should be concrete, such as how benefit design affects visit volume. Writing and APA are graded.
BHA FPX 3112 Assessment 1 help: mistakes that cost marks
Students often define several economic concepts without applying any of them. Another common mistake is describing health care as if it were an ordinary market, ignoring insurance and information gaps. The incentive chain is skipped, so the concept is asserted rather than shown. Evidence is missing, though classic studies like the RAND experiment are easy to cite. Limits of the concept are not discussed. Implications for managers are vague, when the paper could say how a higher deductible might change clinic visit volume. Choosing one behavior and one or two concepts keeps the paper focused and lets the economics do real explanatory work.
Get a BHA FPX 3112 Assessment 1 example written to your instructions
Send the assessment instructions and the scoring guide from your courseroom, and the market behavior you want explained if you have already chosen one. We write a custom BHA FPX 3112 Assessment 1 example against those criteria and return it in 24 to 48 hours. The first custom sample is free. The paper above is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Capella University document.
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BHA FPX 3112 Assessment 1 questions, answered
Which economic concepts work best for this assessment?
The ones that actually explain your case. Elasticity, opportunity cost, moral hazard, adverse selection and information asymmetry all have obvious healthcare footholds, and each fits certain behaviors and not others. Picking a concept first and hunting for a case to attach it to is where papers go wrong. The example chooses the case, then selects the two or three concepts that account for it.
Can I use my own workplace as the case?
Usually yes, if you keep to information you are permitted to discuss and avoid anything confidential or patient identifiable. Familiar cases tend to produce better reasoning because you know the incentives involved. Where internal figures cannot be shared, published or industry data can stand in. The example describes its setting in enough detail to be analyzed without exposing anything sensitive.
How technical does the economics have to be?
Clear reasoning outscores mathematics at this level. The criteria ask whether concepts are applied correctly and whether the explanation holds, not whether you produced an equation. The example uses no formal modeling and still shows elasticity and incentive effects, because the chain from incentive to response to outcome is written out in plain sentences with the evidence attached.
Where can I find a free BHA FPX 3112 Assessment 1 sample paper?
This page contains the full economic concept paper on insurance and care use, with moral hazard and elasticity put to work. A paper on another concept can be modeled for you free.
Which economic concept should I use for BHA FPX 3112 Assessment 1?
Choose one that explains a behavior you can describe clearly, such as moral hazard for rising use with better coverage, adverse selection for insurance pools or supply and demand for workforce shortages.