| Course | NURS FPX 8022 Nursing Technology and Advanced Healthcare Information Systems |
|---|---|
| Assessment | Assessment 2 |
| Paper type | System optimization plan |
| Length | About 1,080 words, 5 pages |
| Format | APA 7 student paper |
| School | Capella University |
| Program | DNP |
| Updated | September 2026 |
Free sample paper for NURS FPX 8022 Assessment 2
Optimizing a Clinical Decision Support Alert in Practice: A Nursing Sepsis Screening Alert Overridden 90% of the Time
Student Name
Capella University
NURS FPX 8022: Nursing Technology and Advanced Healthcare Information Systems
Instructor Name
Month Day, Year
Introduction
Clinical decision support alerts are meant to prompt the right action at the right time, but when they fire too often or at the wrong moment, clinicians learn to dismiss them. This paper examines a nursing sepsis screening alert in a 300-bed hospital's electronic health record, which fires when a patient meets two or more systemic inflammatory response criteria and asks the nurse to complete a sepsis screen. Over the past quarter, nurses dismissed the alert without completing the screen 90% of the time. The paper describes how the alert was studied, what was found, the changes made one at a time, and the results.
Watch, Do Not Only Ask
The analysis began with observation rather than a survey. Two informatics nurses observed 40 alert firings on four medical-surgical units across day, evening, and night shifts. Surveys alone would have captured what nurses believed about the alert; observation captured what actually happened. The observers found that 60% of firings occurred while the nurse was documenting vital signs at the start of a medication pass, that most fired for patients with a known explanation for the abnormal values, such as a postoperative fever or tachycardia from pain, and that nurses often dismissed the alert with a single click without reading it. Observation revealed that the alert interrupted nurses at the worst possible time and for patients whose abnormal values were already explained, which no survey question would have uncovered as precisely.
Configuration or Product Limit
Each finding was classified as a configuration issue, which the hospital could change, or a product limit, which only the vendor could change. The criteria that trigger the alert are configurable: the hospital had chosen two systemic inflammatory response criteria, the most sensitive and least specific option. The timing is configurable: the alert fires on vital sign entry, but could fire on a delay. The inability to suppress the alert for a patient already screened in the past 12 hours was a product limit in the current version, although a newer version supports it. Most problems, therefore, were within the hospital's control.
Alert Burden as Design
Alert fatigue is often described as a problem of clinician behavior, but it is better understood as a design problem. When an alert fires frequently with a low positive predictive value, dismissing it becomes a rational response to the information environment. Studies of clinical decision support have found that clinicians accept fewer alerts as their workload and the number of repeated alerts increase (Ancker et al., 2017). The sepsis alert's 90% dismissal rate reflects a design that asks nurses to act on signals that are mostly false.
One Change at a Time
Changes were made one at a time so that the effect of each could be measured. The first change, implemented for four weeks, raised the trigger from two to three criteria, including at least one of hypotension, elevated respiratory rate, or altered mental status. The second change, implemented for the next four weeks, delayed the alert by 30 minutes after vital sign entry, firing only if the values remained abnormal on recheck or if no recheck had been documented. The third change, planned after an upgrade, will suppress repeat alerts for 12 hours after a completed screen. Making changes sequentially allowed the team to attribute effects to each change rather than to the package as a whole.
Measured Again Afterward
After the first change, alert firings fell by 58%, the proportion of firings leading to a completed screen rose from 10% to 34%, and the number of patients later diagnosed with sepsis who had triggered the alert fell only slightly, from 94% to 91% of cases. After the second change, firings fell by a further 22%, and the completion rate rose to 47%. The small loss of sensitivity after the first change was judged acceptable because nurses were now completing screens for most patients who truly needed them, rather than dismissing nearly all alerts. The team reviewed the three sepsis cases missed by the revised alert and found that all three were identified within two hours by other means.
Safety Monitoring During Changes
Because alert changes could miss true sepsis, the team monitored every patient diagnosed with sepsis during the change periods, reviewing whether the alert fired and when treatment began. The sepsis committee reviewed the data weekly, with authority to reverse any change. Sittig and Singh (2010) emphasize that health information technology changes must be monitored for effects on safety because technology interacts with people, workflow, and organizational context in ways that are hard to predict.
Governance of the Changes
The changes were approved by the hospital's clinical decision support committee, which includes nursing, medicine, pharmacy, and informatics. Each change was documented with its rationale, the expected effect, and the measure used to evaluate it. This governance matters because alert configuration affects patient safety; changes made informally by one department can have effects no one anticipated. The committee also set a rule that no alert may be changed without a plan to measure its effect before and after, which the sepsis project helped establish.
Nurse Perspective After the Changes
Nurses surveyed after the changes reported that the alert was more useful and less disruptive. Several noted that the delayed alert now served as a reminder to recheck vital signs, which they considered good practice. A few still found the alert intrusive during busy medication passes, which the planned suppression feature is expected to address once the upgrade is installed.
Lessons for Other Alerts
The approach applies to other alerts: observe practice, classify problems, treat burden as a design issue, change one thing at a time, and measure both benefit and harm. The hospital plans to apply it to its fall risk and pressure injury alerts next, beginning with the fall alert, which nurses dismiss almost as often as the original sepsis alert and which fires for nearly every patient over 65 regardless of mobility.
Conclusion
A nursing sepsis alert dismissed 90% of the time was redesigned through observation, targeted configuration changes made one at a time, and repeated measurement. Screening completion rose substantially with a small, monitored loss of sensitivity, showing that alert burden is a design problem that can be solved with careful, measured changes.
References
Ancker, J. S., Edwards, A., Nosal, S., Hauser, D., Mauer, E., & Kaushal, R. (2017). Effects of workload, work complexity, and repeated alerts on alert fatigue in a clinical decision support system. BMC Medical Informatics and Decision Making, 17(1), Article 36. https://doi.org/10.1186/s12911-017-0430-8
Sittig, D. F., & Singh, H. (2010). A new sociotechnical model for studying health information technology in complex adaptive healthcare systems. Quality and Safety in Health Care, 19(Suppl. 3), i68-i74.
Reading the NURS-FPX8022 Assessment 2 instructions
The instructions ask you to plan the optimization of a health information system or feature already in use. You gather user complaints and observe actual use, diagnose the causes of problems, propose specific changes, sequence and test them, monitor safety, and measure the results. Optimization improves an existing system rather than replacing it, which is usually faster and cheaper. Clinical decision support alerts are a common focus because alert fatigue is widespread. Evidence on alert design and optimization, such as the five rights of clinical decision support, supports the plan. Governance approval for changes should be addressed.
Inside the NURS FPX 8022 Assessment 2 example
Complaint, observation, diagnosis, changes, sequence, verification. A complaint block reports what users say, quoted rather than paraphrased. An observation block records what actually happens at the screen, because what people report and what they do diverge more here than anywhere. A diagnosis block sorts the findings into configuration, workflow, training and product limitation, which is the distinction the whole plan turns on. A changes block specifies each modification, who makes it, and what it changes for the user. A sequence block spaces the changes so a unit absorbs them one at a time. A verification block returns to the same measures afterward, since optimization claimed without remeasurement is an assertion. Governance approval for each configuration change is identified, because clinical systems are not edited informally.
Reading the NURS FPX 8022 Assessment 2 scoring guide
Capella's scoring guide rates the problem analysis, the observation, the diagnosis, the proposed changes, the sequencing, the safety monitoring and the evaluation. Observation reaches Distinguished when it records what nurses do at the screen, not only what they say in surveys. Diagnosis scores higher when problems are sorted into configuration, workflow, training and product causes, because each calls for a different fix. Changes earn credit when specific and made one at a time, so their effects can be attributed. Safety monitoring during changes is essential for a sepsis alert, since fewer alerts could mean missed patients. Evaluation should re-measure the original problem, including override rates and time to treatment. Governance approval shows organizational awareness. Doctoral synthesis and APA form are expected.
NURS FPX 8022 Assessment 2 help: mistakes that cost marks
Students often propose replacing the system instead of optimizing it, which ignores cost and the years a new system takes. Another common mistake is relying on surveys of complaints without watching use, which misses workarounds nurses no longer notice. Diagnosis is skipped, so changes target symptoms rather than causes. Multiple changes at once make it impossible to know what worked. Safety monitoring is forgotten, even though turning down an alert could miss a real case of sepsis. Re-measurement is missing, so success is claimed without evidence. Nurses are not asked again after the changes. A model optimization plan for your own system can be written for you at no charge.
Get a NURS FPX 8022 Assessment 2 example written to your instructions
Send the Assessment 2 instructions and the scoring guide from your NURS FPX 8022 courseroom, plus the system and the setting your own plan covers. We write a custom example against those exact criteria and return it in 24 to 48 hours. The first custom sample is free, and separating what configuration can fix from what the product cannot do is where this plan earns its marks. The paper above is an original model document written by our desk, not a submitted student paper and not an official Capella University document.
More NURS FPX 8022 papers and DNP samples
- NURS FPX 8022 Assessment 1: Using Data to Make Evidence-Based Technology Recommendations
- NURS FPX 8022 Assessment 3: Risk Mitigation Plan
- NURS FPX 8024 Assessment 2: Interventions Compared Across Health Systems
- NURS FPX 8020 Assessment 2: Strategic Plan Development
- NURS FPX 9000 Assessment 2: VCI Summary
- NURS FPX 8008 Assessment 2: Redesigning a Shared Decision-Making Process
NURS FPX 8022 Assessment 2 questions, answered
Why not just recommend replacing the system?
Because it will not be funded and it usually would not help. Replacement costs years and most of the complaints follow the organization into the new system, since they come from configuration decisions and workflow rather than from the product. A plan that optimizes what exists can be approved this quarter, which is what makes it worth writing.
How do I find out what is really wrong?
Sit and watch someone use it. Clinicians report the thing that annoyed them most recently, not the step that costs them the most time, and the two are rarely the same. Twenty minutes of observation on two shifts will give you specifics that a survey never will, and specifics are what a configuration team can act on.
How should alert fatigue be handled?
As a design problem. An alert firing on a threshold set for a different population will be dismissed, and dismissing it is the rational response rather than a compliance failure. The plan should propose retuning or retiring specific alerts, with the firing counts to justify each decision, and should say who has authority to approve that change.
Where can I find a free NURS FPX 8022 Assessment 2 sample paper?
This page holds the full sepsis alert optimization plan, with observation, diagnosis, sequenced changes, safety monitoring, governance and re-measurement. A free custom plan is available.
How do I reduce alert fatigue in NURS FPX 8022 Assessment 2?
Diagnose why the alert fires and is overridden, then adjust its logic, timing, target user and presentation one change at a time, monitoring for missed cases. The five rights of clinical decision support are a useful frame.